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'Economic Warfare at Sea" is a centuries-old practice often employed by 
naval forces of nations seeking to gain victory by reducing the enemy's 
warfighting potential, rather than frontally attacking on land and overcoming 
him through bloody assault. If this practice has been used down the years, it is 
also a very current tool in prosecuting warfare in the late twentieth century, as 
most recently demonstrated in the eight-year Iran-Iraq War. So it is most 
appropriate, at a symposium on the "Law of Naval Warfare and the Targeting 
of Merchant Shipping", that we consider the strategic imperatives which may 
drive the belligerent nations to attack the merchant shipping of their enemy, and 
even of neutrals, while we also consider the reciprocal imperatives which may 
drive the neutral nations to defend their merchant shipping. 
In ancient times, nations did not have the benefit of an international code to 
mark the legal bounds of their conduct of war at sea. In modern times, 
particularly in the twentieth century, these bounds oflawful maritime behavior 
have been defined with some precision and tabulated. But they are quite 
frequently transgressed even by the "best" in the family of nations. Indeed, the 
layman might be surprised to learn that the international law of naval warfare is 
as frequently determined by "customary law" as it is by laws codified in treaties.1 
Therefore, in putting into practice their strategic imperatives, nations can 
actually rewrite the law of naval warfare - provided they obtain enough 
concurrence in theory, and congruence in practice, among other nations. 
In this paper, I intend to explore strategic imperatives within two generalized 
scenarios: first, in global conventional war between the two superpowers and 
their respective alliances; next, in the context oflimited conflicts between two 
nations other than the superpowers. I will also look at some of the future variables 
in limited war at sea, as brought about by transfers of technology and the 
horizontal proliferation of sophisticated weapon systems. 
I have decided not to treat scenarios which include nuclear exchanges among 
any of the current or candidate nuclear powers. In such a circumstance, 
economic warfare at sea would have been so overshadowed by the nuclear 
conflict as to greatly diminish the weight of considerations given to international 
law at the lower levels of conflict. The powers involved would undoubtedly do 
whatever they deemed essential to conduct warfare at the more destructive 
levels. The nuclear "imperatives" would be so compelling as to deemphasize the 
finer points of the law of armed conflict. One eminent jurist has said it this way: 
"if it came to the point where strategic nuclear weapons were resorted to, the 
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boundaries of limited war would have been passed and the law would have little 
relevance. ,,2 
Before going further, though, let us narrow the focus on what it is we will 
be discussing when we refer in this paper to "economic warfare at sea." In the 
modem literature on economic warfare, there are entire volumes written which 
include under this general heading any form of coercion which is used by a 
nation to reduce the economic strength and war potential of an adversary.3 While 
that may be a useful definition for broader treatises, in this instance we will limit 
our definition of "economic warfare at sea" to the use or threat of use of military 
means in a maritime environment to reduce the power of an enemy during overt 
hostilities. 
The Case of Global Conventional War 
Now let's take a look at the first scenario: global conventional war between 
the Warsaw Pact and NATO. In recent years, the writing of a plausible scenario 
for the start of such a war has challenged the intellects of some of our best strategic 
thinkers. They invariably conclude that no intelligent scenario can be devised 
which could possibly justifY launching such a conflict. 
Since the advent of perestroika, and particularly over the last six months, it has 
become increasingly difficult to imagine the Warsaw Pact as a viable fighting 
alliance; we would have to regress to the politics of the Brezhnev era to be able 
to imagine the unimaginable. But for the sake of strategic imperatives and 
international law, let us assume such a war "happened." After all, the military 
and naval forces for such a conflict still exist; it's only the changeable political 
forces which have made a NATOlWarsaw Pact war less likely. 
In the Warsaw Pact - NATO scenario, the easiest conclusion to reach with 
regard to economic warfare at sea is one that says: The Warsaw Pact has interior 
lines of communication; NATO depends on the sea lines of communication 
(SLOe); therefore, the Soviets are compelled to resort to unrestricted warfare 
against merchantmen to stop the flow of reinforcements and resupply from the 
United States to Europe. 
To strengthen that conclusion, many would compare the Soviets' inventory 
of over 350 submarines with that of Germany's inventory ofless than 50 at the 
start of World War II. It's never quite that simple. While the obvious may have 
some ring of truth, there are complicating factors on both sides of the equation. 
In a protracted war between the two super-alliances, it would be reasonable 
to expect both sides to attempt to avoid crossing the nuclear threshold. Yet so 
powerful and ultimate are the nuclear arsenals that both sides would be likely to 
focus as much or more on the nuclear balance as they would on the battles in 
the ongoing campaign, in what the Soviets have called the "conventional phase" 
of war. 
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The Soviets have long emphasized the importance of their maritime defense 
perimeter as a means of protecting the homeland. They write of the need to 
establish "sea denial" zones and to destroy NATO naval forces in those areas. 
They are particularly concerned about platforms equipped with nuclear strike 
weapons - that is, those that can threaten the homeland with nuclear warheads 
contained in cruise missiles, gravity bombs, and ballistic missiles. Closer to the 
homeland, the Soviets have delineated "sea control" areas in which they would 
particularly desire to prevent the penetration of NATO's nuclear-powered 
attack submarines (SSNs). Even in 1990, NATO, and especially the United 
States, has such superiority in individual nuclear submarine performance that the 
Soviets must maintain defensive forces in depth to protect the seabased element 
of their strategic nuclear forces. This is no mean task and will require many 
nuclear attack submarines and other surface and air platforms dedicated to the 
defense of their ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). 
The United States Navy has already dispersed its nuclear strike arsenal, and 
will continue to do so throughout the 1990s. Instead of having fourteen carriers 
and fewer than forty SSBNs capable of nuclear strike, the U.S. Navy continues 
to fit out Tomahawk missiles in more than 80 attack submarines and 55 surface 
combatants already in the Fleet, with more to come. Along with the SSBNs of 
our British and French allies, this nuclear-capable naval force puts a great strain 
on the assets of the Soviet Navy for defense of the homeland. In the near term, 
they are faced with over 200 NATO ships and submarines, and 500 U.S. 
sea-based strike aircraft, all capable of penetrating the heart of Mother Russia 
with nuclear warheads. 
Such a strong NATO offensive maritime force complicates that easily-con-
trived Soviet "strategic imperative" for SLOC interdiction of merchant shipping. 
It means that the Soviets can ill afford an extensive naval campaign against enemy 
merchantmen, let alone against truly neutral merchantmen. They would have 
to concentrate more on targets which include naval combatants, naval auxiliaries, 
reinforcement shipping in convoys, and amphibious task forces. All of these ships 
are either prima facie military warships or can be said to have taken on the 
character of warships. Therefore, according to current international law, they 
are subject to attack without warning. 
There are also tactical considerations which militate against indiscriminate 
attacks on merchantmen in the global scenario. The first applies to submarines 
in particular: with so many other, more lucrative targets at sea, it would seldom 
be worth it to reveal a submarine's position in order to destroy one mer-
chantman, be it an enemy or a bonafide neutral carrying neutral cargo to a neutral 
port. With the responsiveness and capabilities of NATO Maritime Patrol 
Aircraft, ASW (anti-submarine warfare) surface combatants and submarines, the 
reward for attacking innocent merchantmen is not likely to overcome the risk 
factor, particularly for the classes of Soviet nuclear attack submarines likely to 
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be assigned to such SLoe du~es. Secondly, the Soviet Navy's ability to replenish 
weapons at sea is so limited, especially if engaged in combat with NATO, that 
there are likely to be practical if not doctrinal restrictions placed on the threshold 
value of targets to be attacked and on the minimum number of weapons to be 
retained for self-defense. While these considerations apply mostly to combatant 
ships, especially submarines, similar practical limits will apply to maritime strike 
aircraft and their Long-Range Aviation counterparts. For the European Theater 
in particular, Soviet bombers will have to penetrate NATO land-based air 
defenses to get at most ship targets. Is it worth it to attempt to transit this hostile 
airspace and then, perhaps, to be confronted by naval air defenses in order to 
sink individual merchantmen? We think not. 
So the strategic imperative of hitting NATO's reinforcement and resupply 
shipping is not necessarily so compelling early in a NATO-Warsaw Pact war. 
That is not to say that the Soviets might not attempt such a campaign on a 
limited scale. They undoubtedly would, iffor no other reason than to complicate 
the problem for the NATO navies by tying down ASW assets. Nevertheless, 
their primary targets will be naval combatants and such merchant ships as are 
included in convoys or other task groups - those laden with military hardware 
and other military supplies. Their attacks should be concentrated on these 
legitimate targets - militarily-useful ships - and not on what's commonly referred 
to as "economic shipping." The latter, which would carry essential foodstuffi 
and other sustainment for the civilian populations, may be dispatched on 
individual sailings in protected sea lanes. In such circumstances, they represent 
low-value, moderate-risk targets, and generally ought not to be regarded as 
worth the effort in the Soviet's calculus. 
The truly compelling thing about the World War III scenario is the high 
stakes for the participant nations. If World War II were so hard-fought at sea 
with so little regard for the inviolability of international law with respect to 
merchant shipping, and if the Nuremberg courts were so understanding of 
violations oflaw in this area, then why should World War III be any less 
compulsive when it comes to risk-benefit analysis? The one overriding impera-
tive from the Soviet point of view is likely to be maximization of exchange 
ratios, whatever the target, and to hell with international law. 
The same might be said for the problem of inadvertent targeting of non-com-
batants by Soviet over-the-horizon missiles, be they sub-, air-, or surface-
launched. It is probably a question of the solutions retrieved from a 
correlation-~f-forces equation more than a question of compliance with law. 
How many weapons are left in the inventory, and is the missile platform likely 
to return to fight another day? In most cases, positive visual identification is not 
worth the trouble! 
So much for the Soviets in this scenario and their strategic imperatives on the 
offensive. 
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From the perspective of the u.s. and NATO, what will be the strategic 
imperatives regarding economic warfare at sea in the same scenario? 
Certainly the Soviets can reach all their Warsaw Pact allies and their Far 
Eastern Continental Theater via land lines of communication. However, the 
Trans-Siberian Railway, deep as it is inside the Soviet Union, is still vulnerable 
to destruction at key junctures. Even though breaks in that intercontinental 
conveyor might not mean more than a temporary disruption in its services, we 
should expect that the Soviets have planned for such contingencies, and that the 
Far Eastern Military District - absent any conflict on the Chinese border - could 
be essentially self-sustaining in military supplies and foodstuffi for at least six 
months. 
The polar shipping route, used in the warmer months, could be easily 
interdicted; the Danish and Turkish Straits, hopefully still under NATO control 
or at least mined closed, would preclude the need for an oceanic SLOC campaign 
by NATO. Nevertheless, there are other areas where NATO should be 
aggressively pressing interdiction of Warsaw Pact merchantmen. These are in 
the Baltic and Black Seas. With NATO dedicating much of its air power to 
FOFA - Follow On Forces Attack - or deep interdiction, the Baltic and Black 
Seas would be important reinforcement waterways to Poland, East Germary, 
Bulgaria, Romania and, via the Danube and other rivers, even to the heart of 
central Europe. There are not likely to be many neutral merchantmen in the 
way, even from the Scandinavian countries. 
In summary then, what conclusions would we take from our consideration 
of the first scenario - general, conventional, worldwide war - and the strategic 
imperatives pertaining to economic warfare at sea. First, we would conclude 
that, because the stakes are so high, both sides would do what they must to 
succeed. Faint attempts might be made to enshroud, within the cloak of the law, 
those naval encounters with merchantmen carrying only humanitarian support 
for civilians. But not much time will be spent debating proprieties; practical 
exigencies will dominate, as they did in World War II. 
Second, NATO and the neutrals of the world would generally benefit from 
the strictest adherence by all parties, to the international law dealing with 
combatants and merchantmen. The Warsaw Treaty Organization would have 
the least to gain by complying with such law. At any rate, because of some very 
practical war-fighting constraints in the nuclear age, the Soviets are not likely to 
expend considerable resources on merchantmen dedicted to "economic" car-
goes. 
Limited Conflicts 
For our second scenario, I have chosen limited conflicts between two nations 
other than the United States and the Soviet Union. I don't intend to use any 
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particular conflict or set of adversaries as a case study. Rather, I'll treat limited 
war at sea as a general category of conflict, and I'll consider strategic imperatives 
in these circumstances as necessary judgments or propositions of not only 
belligerents on the one hand, but those of the neutrals as well. Then I'll refer to 
the major powers as a particular class of neutrals. 
For our purposes, perhaps the best treatment of the genus "limited war" is 
that contained in the second volume of D.P. O'Connell's The IntemationalLAw 
of the Sea. In it he categorizes all conflicts since World War II as limited conflicts, 
and then states that the characteristic limitations of these conflicts were one or 
more of the following: "the theater of operations; the scale of operations and 
level of weaponry; and the graduation of force and the scale of response.,,4 I'll 
adopt these as descriptors for my treatment of economic warfare at sea in a limited 
war. Later I'll discuss the potential for outgrowing these limitations. 
First, we must remember that the belligerents in limited wars will usually have 
that same strategic imperative that the major powers had in World War II: that 
is, to achieve victory. Whether it be war between Iran and Iraq, Arabs and 
Israelis, or India and Pakistan, the first objective is success in combat. It is only 
when the first goal is not attainable that most countries will settle for a "draw," 
or, as a last resort, will they opt for national survival in circumstances that would 
otherwise represent total defeat. These statements may be self-evident, but 
sometimes we seem to forget them. It should be understandable that the behavior 
of "third-world" nations, as warriors, can be as fiercely dedicated toward that 
first goal of victory as the Axis or Allied powers were in the last World War. 
After all, they too are fighting for personal and national survival. As long as they 
seem to be able to achieve their goal, while remaining within the principal 
bounds of commonly accepted international law, most will comply with the 
rules, and most will keep their war "limited." Frustrate their progress toward 
that goal, however, and we can expect that they will depart from international 
law, as required, in order to restore their progress. It seems that, the closer nations 
come to defeat, the more dastardly are their deeds. 
In 1983, after having been at war with Iran for three years, Iraq looked is if 
it would be defeated by sheer force of numbers. At that point, Iraq resorted to 
the first use of chemical weapons.s Later, as the Iraqi air blockade pulled the 
noose tighter around Iranian oil exports, the Iranians responded with the illegal 
use of mines and indiscriminate attacks upon neutral shipping.6 As one observer 
put it, "the very success ofIraq's air blockade compelled Iranian retaliation.,,7 
It's also instructive to remember that, in both World Wars, belligerents on 
both sides varied their compliance with the law of naval warfare, as it was 
understood, with regard to submarine attacks on merchant shipping. In the First 
World War, the Germans did several legalistic U-turns in the U-boat campaign, 
alternately forbidding and permitting unrestricted submarine warfare against 
merchantmen. Again in the Second World War, Germany began by observing 
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the London Protocol of 1936, but by 1940 unrestricted submarine warfare was 
once more the order of the day; and the United States entered the war using the 
more practical standard instead of that prescribed by the Protocol. 8 Adherence 
to international law seems to have a lot to do with desperation and advantage in 
combat. 
Why should we, then, expect greater compliance with international law in 
limited wars than we have seen in the two world wars? It reminds one of the 
rifleman's complaint against the term "Lower Intensity Conflict"; he asks: 
"lower intensity for whom?" 
The second strategic imperative in economic warfare at sea during limited 
conflicts is one the neutrals should be demanding of the belligerents - that is, 
adherence to the law of neutrality. 
If the law of neutrality had its origin in the doctrines of mercantilism, its 
evolution to this day has been generally beneficial for the material well-being of 
most of mankind. But we are now really only at the threshold of an era where 
the preservation of that law becomes even more challenging. Three occurrences 
in the last two decades have demonstrated the increasing importance of the 
interdependence in trade and investment of the world's nations. The first was 
the OPEC countries' successful constriction of the world's oil supply in the 1970s 
and the resultant economic dislocations, not the least of which was the high rate 
of inflation in the United States; second was the crash of the international 
financial markets, more or less in unison, in October 1987; and third was the 
infringement upon neutral rights in the Iran-Iraq War. 
Economic disruptions in one part of the world have tended to cascade into 
major crises in other corners of the world. This chain reaction among the major 
powers has occurred repeatedly, not just in the three major events mentioned, 
but in many other lesser ones as well. In that same twenty year period, we have 
seen how some smaller states, e.g. Iran, Syria, Israel, Libya, and even Saudi 
Arabia, have been able to leverage their influence over world events - all out of 
proportion to their populations and resources in the family of nations. 
So as the world political economy becomes more interrelated if not inter-
locked, nations must individually and collectively demand stricter observance of 
the rights of neutrals. If the barbarians wish to fight the barbarians, their battles 
must be constrained by the law of armed conflict, including the law of neutrality. 
Our third imperative is merely a corollary of the second; it says that 
enforcement of the law of neutrality will be required. The more powerful nations 
will not allow themselves to be weakened or economically devastated as a result 
of conflict among lesser powers. When a society ,achieves a higher standard of 
living over a period of time, that higher standard of living redefines those things 
which are considered "necessities" of life. So it will be the populaces, if not the 
governments, who will demand noninterference with their material pleasures. 
Stating the imperative in this manner still leaves open the question as to how to 
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enforce this neutral side of international law. Diplomats and jurists would 
undoubtedly adopt the more reasonable and pacific approaches to dissuade 
belligerents from infringing on the rights of neutrals. The preferred methods in 
such matters would range from the use of "enraged world public opinion", to 
economic sanctions short of overt hostilities, to demands for adherence to law, 
to exhortations for "police action" under the auspices of the United Nations. 
Unquestionably, these are the most desirable means for the restoration of the 
rights of neutrals - the court or courts of first resort. Any experienced military 
advisor should also prefer these means to the final arbiter, the use of superior 
force. 
Yet if none of the pacific means succeeds, the use of sufficient force may 
become the only remaining option - short of taking no action and suffering the 
further erosion of the rights of neutrals as a consequence. The key word, of 
course, is "sufficient." On the one hand, in this legal frame of reference, one 
should first acknowledge that some basic principles apply: the doctrines of 
military necessity, proportionality, and humanity. These are concepts of which 
all of you are most knowledgeable. They all righdy serve to limit the amount, 
type and manner in which force may be applied even in upholding the law. 
The question of sufficiency or economy of force, however, has another side 
to it: what is enough force for mission accomplishment, that is, for the 
enforcement of the rights of neutrals? I will shordy discuss the case of sufficiency 
of naval forces for guaranteeing the freedom of the seas in the future. For now, 
let's consider the present-day sufficiency. The most interesting historical case 
with closest proximity in time is the Persian Gulf War and the self-help 
enforcement actions of the United States and some of our NATO allies operating 
in a non-NATO framework. Generally we can say that sufficient but not 
excessive force was used by neutrals in and over the Gul£ The two extremes in 
this application of force in defense of the rights of neutrals were the Stark and 
Vincennes incidents. Both represent aberrations from the intended norm of 
self-defense - the Stark incident being a failure to act, and the Vincennes a 
precipitous action taken in error. Both extremes are well documented in the 
li 9 open terature. 
Contrasting with them are the circumstances and execution of Operation 
Praying Mantis, the U.S. Navy's anti-Iranian strikes in the Persian Gulf on April 
18, 1988. After reading the first-hand accounts of two senior commanders in 
that battle, one would be hard-pressed to criticize the operation for the 
applications of either too much or too litde force. Unquestionably, more force 
was available than was applied, and the operation did not extend too far in terms 
of time, or in terms of additional targets. They might have hit other naval targets 
in port, or land-based targets such as the Silkworm missiles, or some of the 
airborne Iranian fighters - but they didn't. to 
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With the benefit of historical vision, however, let's look at another proposal, 
and how it might have fared in the same battle. In an article in the New York 
Times on October 20, 1987 and at various other forums in that timeframe, Elliot 
Richardson and Cyrus Vance together suggested that the duties of enforcer in 
the Gulf could be performed with less hazard through U.N. auspices, utilizing 
a number of unarmed patrol boats as well as naval vessels from member 
states, not to include the U.s. or U.S.S.RY On another occasion, Mr. 
Richardson stated: "You would then have a small U.N. fleet with an effective 
capability comparable to the U.s. presence in the Gulf today - somewhat smaller, 
perhaps, but essentially equivalent.,,12 For command and control, Mr. 
Richardson would have enjoined the Security Council of the U.N., as a body, 
to "decide in advance what kind of response would be appropriate to what kind 
of provocation" ... should the U.N. escort vessels themselves ... "be subject 
to some significant attack." At the time he was comparing the proposed U.N. 
force of frigates with a U.s. Navy force of38 shipsP 
Without comparing the proposed and the real-world forces in every respect, 
and without detailing each action of the Iranians during Operation Praying 
Mantis, one might characterize Mr. Richardson's proposal as a formula for U.N. 
disaster. In it he demonstrated a serious lack of understanding of the military 
problem in the Gulf in 1987-88. He not only underestimated the capabilities of 
Iranian patrol boats, guided missile frigates, and fighter aircraft, he also underes-
timated the contributions of U.S. Air Force AWACs aircraft and KC-1 0 tankers, 
and particularly the complexities of the command, control and communications 
problems, especially the positive ID requirement with Soviets and other third 
parties intermingled.14 One might also surmise that he had never studied the 
Falklands/Malvinas campaign to discover how close the Royal Navy had come 
to sustaining more grievous losses in May-June 1982. 
In summary, then, the point of this strategic imperative is to ensure that you 
send more than enough force to accomplish the mission of enforcing the rights 
of neutrals, and then measure your response to violations of those rights. 
For our last proposition, we would maintain that, in order to keep limited 
wars limited, it is essential to maintain some distance between the major powers. 
By this we mean that, almost by definition, we should not allow both the Soviet 
Union and the United States to become active "enforcers" of neutrality in the 
same theater of operations - particularly if they were to view themselves as 
enforcers against one another's clients. 
Most recently in the Persian Gulf War, one could easily build a case to 
support the thesis that both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. leaned (perhaps rather heavily) 
toward Iraq and away from Iran. So the superpowers did not assume the 
roles of opposing military powers in that case. Nevertheless, as reported in the 
Naval Institute Proceedings, at one point during Operation Praying Mantis, the 
U.s. destroyer Merrill had a warship closing at 25 knots; it was tentatively 
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interpreted to be a "possible Iranian SAAM FFG". As Menill made preparations 
for a Harpoon missile attack amidst the many other hostile actions that day, a 
U.S. helicopter investigated the target at closer range, obtaining positive iden-
tification on a Soviet Sovremenny-class DDG.15 
The circumstances were substantially different in the Indo-Pakistani War of 
December 1971. O'Connell treats the differences succinctly: 
"The naval operations conducted by India against the port of Karachi and in the 
Gulf ofBengal took no account ofintemationallaw, which was, indeed deliberate-
ly put to one side by the Indian naval staff. The result was that the operations 
spilled over into the high seas, a naval blockade of Pakistan was proclaimed, and 
shipping was attacked. In the course of these operations neutral ships were sunk, 
one with total loss of life. In every sense, the Indian naval operations accepted no 
limitation as to area or scale. Was this then a case of 'limited war,?16 
The only limitation seems to have been in the duration of the conflict; it 
lasted only two weeks. What if it had lasted longer; what if the proclaimed 
blockade had been prolonged and effective; what if tanker traffic in the nearby 
Persian Gulf had become involved, while the United States was deeply com-
mitted to the Vietnam War? 
The important factor, which is often overlooked in considering the Indo-
Pakistani War, is that both the United States and the Soviet Union sent task 
groups to the high seas of the Bay of Bengal, where the aircraft carrier USS 
Enterprise and her escorts took measure of the Soviet group which included some 
of their most modem cruisers. Even if the mission had only been enforcement 
of the law of neutrality, what mischief might have ensued? 
The Soviet Union and the United States are now beginning to find areas of 
mutually beneficial, not competing interests. But, for this paper, I don't intend 
to limit our definition of"major powers" to those two nations. In terms of naval 
forces, at least two of our NATO allies can currently be categorized as "major 
powers", and we would also include China, and Japan as powers with very 
sizeable and capable navies. It is important that these powers, as well, do not face 
off against each other in conflicts started by opposing" client" states. 
At the same time, we are faced with a "use it or lose it" quandary: someone 
will have to protect the rights of nonbelligerents, or the law of neutrality will 
become non-existent. One would hope that other nations, not parties to limited 
wars, would actively protect their own rights when capable of doing so, and not 
rely on the United States Navy to do all the dirty work. 
Future Wars and Weapons 
It does no good to lament the demise of the legality of "war" and the efficacy 
of the law of war merely because Article 2 of the United Nations Charter outlaws 
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the use of force in resolving international disputes. It would appear that, in fact, 
nations continue to fight "wars" in the last half of the twentieth century about 
as often as they did in the previous one hundred and fifty years. We now have 
as great a need for the laws of anned conflict and neutrality as we had prior to 
1945. For the benefit of belligerents and non-combatants alike - both nations 
and individuals - it is essential to protect and preserve as much of that body of 
international law as we can. Without both the law and enforcement of the law, 
"limited" wars of the future could easily get well beyond the limiting factors 
that we accepted earlier in the paper: "the theater of operations; the scale of 
operations and level of weaponry, and the graduation offorce and the scale of 
response.,,17 I'll restrict my discussion of the future to that element of limited 
war to which I was assigned, namely economic warfare at sea. But there are 
obvious parallels in land warfare which one can easily imagine without their 
being drawn out here. 
The inevitable development I see in the future is the proliferation of the 
possession and use of more sophisticated and more destructive weapons systems 
among many more countries. A recession in the arms industries of the Western 
democracies and others - due to the events in Eastern Europe - is likely to spur 
brisk competition to satisfy third-world demands at international arms bazaars. 
Old enmities are not likely to soon fade away. So I would anticipate that these 
new systems will eventually be employed in limited conflicts, against both 
belligerents and neutrals, unless the penalties for their illegal use are prohibitively 
high. The weapons we have in mind are: cruise and ballistic missiles with 
conventional and chemical warheads; more sophisticated mines at sea; nuclear 
submarines; precision targeting systems employed with conventional warheads 
of far greater destructive power; stronger land-based air forces with enhanced 
capabilities for war at sea; and, in some cases, increased sea-based aviation 
capabilities. 
Iraq's economic warfare against Iran is credited with "the distinction of being 
perhaps the sole example in history of a successful economic blockade essentially 
carried out by air power alone.,,18 But it does not stand alone as a use of 
land-based tactical aviation, armed with air-to-surface missiles, employed in war 
at sea. In the Falklands-Malvinas conflict, Argentina was extremely successful in 
attacking Royal Navy ships with only five Super-Etendard aircraft and about as 
many Exocet missiles. These events tell us that we can expect more of the same 
employment in the future, only with longer-range aircraft and missiles. In the 
Praying Mantis operation, the u.S. required positive visual identification before 
permitting ships and aircraft to attack surface combatants with medium-range 
Harpoon, Walleye, and Standard missiles. This required u.S. helicopters and 
attack aircraft to risk the first few rounds of SAMs and gunfire as they got close 
enough for positive identification with the prevailing limit of visibility.19 
Although there are electronic and infrared means of detection and classification 
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of targets, some countries may not have these means to identify targets from a 
distance, yet will have the aircraft and missiles to press the attack. Will they 
hazard themselves to take a quick look-see on the first pass? The answer is 
probably not unless they can expect retribution for attacking a truly neutral 
merchantman, or an escorting neutral combatant. Argentine aircraft were flying 
roughly 350 nautical miles, with inflight refueling, in order to reach their targets. 
What does that tell us about the future limitation on the extent of the theater of 
operations? 
In both the Indo-Pakistani and the Falklands-Malvinas wars, submarines were 
used in combat.2o In fact, in the Falklands we had the first use of a nuclear-
powered submarine in combat. The ownership of nuclear submarines is spread-
ing to the third-world as India has received the first of possibly four Charlie-class 
nuclear-powered attack submarines from the Soviet Union.21 China builds her 
own Han-class SSNs as well as Xia-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile 
submarines. If the U.K. and Germany could impose long-distance blockades on 
each other in the two World Wars, why could not India do likewise with her 
Charlie-class submarines in the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman against 
Pakistan? In fact, if the Argentines had already received their full complements 
ofSuper-Etendards and Exocets before war broke out in 1982, and had driven 
off the British surface fleet, would the next step for the U.K. have been a close 
blockade of Argentine ports by Royal Navy SSN's? 
Write your own scenarios if the ones offered appear too far-fetched. But the 
weapon systems are proliferating and their capabilities in speed, range, and 
destructive power are increasing. Many nations are developing ballistic missile 
capabilities; recent literature suggests that about fifteen nations now have the 
ability to produce mid-range missiles, and India already has a 1500-mile missile, 
the Agni.22 Argentina has been working on the Condor missile with Egypt and 
Iraq. Brazil is investing in the Sonda IV, and Pakistan has its Haft.23 
These may be land attack missiles, but the ability to direct other variants to 
sea, as was done with the Silkworm, can't be too far behind if these nations so 
choose. Couple the general market availability of space-based surveillance 
systems with ballistic or cruise missile delivery systems, and we have a quantum 
leap in the extension of the maritime battlefield from nations that may not 
otherwise be rated as maritime powers. We cannot overlook the possibility of 
chemical warheads for these missiles. Some twenty countries may be producing 
chemical weapons today.24 But it's more likely that they would be used in land 
warfare and would have less utility at sea, except against amphibious operations. 
Neither can we overlook the proliferation of nuclear weapons over the next 
decade. Five or six nations now have nuclear weapons capabilities and roughly 
another twenty-five or so may be nearing that capability.25 Their use at sea may 
# 
be less likely than on land, but they complicate the equations among belligerents 
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and neutrals alike. If that's not enough, let's further exacerbate the problem by 
eventually including sophisticated deep-water mines. 
That will be enough gloom and doom for now. But these are no longer Buck 
Rogers cartoons. They will be near- to mid-term realities. Nearly all these 
weapons will extend the theater and scale of operations. If nations use them from 
the onset of hostilities, then the responses will not be graduated either. Limited 
war at sea will have once more become nearly unlimited. Along the intermediate 
levels of the scale of warfare, it's going to require more than a few NATO frigates, 
and a set of rules of engagement from the Security Council of the United Nations 
for the neutrals to stay competitive in the contest for freedom of the seas. 
The Challenge for International Law 
It would seem that as the proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons 
occurs, the "haves" will generally be deterred from their use against each other 
just as the superpowers have been. The "have-nots" will need alliances with the 
"haves", or the protection of a much more binding moral suasion than has been 
operative in the past. The more likely circumstance, in any case, is the use of 
the more sophisticated conventional weaponry. The U.S. Commission on 
Integrated Long-Term Strategy framed the military challenge thusly: 
"The much greater precision, range, and destructiveness of weapons could extend 
war across a much wider geographic area, make war much more rapid and intense, 
and require entirely new modes of operation. ,,26 
The challenge for international law will be to keep abreast of technological 
change. Is that a question of "writing" new law, or of developing new standards 
of behavior which are accepted as the norms for nations engaged in combat at 
sea? 
From the point of view of the practitioner of the operational art at sea, it 
would seem that we could have more effective law, that is, greater adherence 
to the international standards in a rapidly changing military-technological 
environment if we stuck to the basics, to the principles. The standards of military 
necessity, proportionality, and humanity can be applied across the entire 
spectrum of warfare from "lower intensity conflict" to nuclear warfare. The 
objective should be greater compliance with international law at sea, not a more 
abundant and more restrictive law of naval warfare to be set aside and ignored 
at the firing of the first round. The rate of change in technology and weapons, 
and the rate of proliferation could be too much to keep up with if we are looking 
for a new set of specific prohibitions each step of the way. The more promising 
field could be the persuasion of all, or nearly all of the nations of the world to 
abide by the rules we already have, and to apply them generously. 
263 Lynch 
Of this we can be sure: the future holds the very likely prospect of economic 
warfare at sea; the hostilities will occur further from the shores of the belligerents 
and will be more intense and destructive. The extent to which neutral commerce 
will suffer depends on how effective the non-belligerents are in convincing the 
combatants, either through pacific means or through military coercion, to abide 
by the commonly accepted intemationallaw of the sea. 
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